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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES FOR AIR POLLUTION
INJURIES
I. INTRODUCTION
It is everywhere now and no one escapes it. The intensi-
fying problem of air pollution has reached proportions suffi-
cient to create alarm and dismay in even the most callous
citizen. Yet the ecological enthusiasm of the government and
some public interest groups seems to have waned, and our
overreaching desire for industrial growth continues to kick
environmental problems aside in all but a few cases.' In view
of the threat to life and general damage caused by air pollu-
tion, it is essential that no phase of the anti-pollution effort
be neglected, and for this reason individual suits for damages
against polluters of the air will continue to be vital.
There is no way to minimize the serious dangers of this
problem. It has already been concluded that the segment of
the American population living in polluted urban areas is
twice as likely to die from respiratory ailments between the
ages of 50 and 70 as their counterparts in relatively non-
polluted areas.2 There has also been a general rise in disease
attributable to air pollution including various forms of poison-
ing, lung damage, cancer and heart disease.3 In addition to
this personal injury, air pollution damage to property in this
country has been estimated to exceed eleven billion dollars
a year.4 It would be senseless to allow polluters to continue
inflicting their wastes upon the aesthetics, persons, and prop-
erty of the individuals in our society without compensation
being sought. The purpose of this article is to remind the
general practicing attorney of the possibility of private law-
suits for damages in air pollution cases, and to guide him
in his first approaches to the law in this field.
1. While the concerned citizens of South Carolina were defending Hilton
Head from BASF, Alaskans continued to be faced with a hot oil pipeline and
a nuclear test and offshore oil rigs continued the despoliation of California and
Gulf Coast beaches.
2. Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of
Private Rights, 1967 DuKE L.J. (1967) (hereinafter cited as Juergensmeyer).
3. See Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Pol-
lution of Urban Atnosphere, 33 BRoOKLYN L. REv. 17 (1966) (hereinafter cited
as Rheingold).
4. Juergensmeyer, supra note 2.
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This assertion of private rights will do much to protect
the individual client and aid in the control of a burgeoning
problem. And, while not a new approach, it is an increasingly
popular one. There are many cases fifty to a hundred years
old,5 but the volume of pollution litigation has grown con-
siderably in the last twenty years." This volume is expected
to continue to grow for several reasons: the public conscious-
ness of pollution has grown, air pollution statutes have pro-
liferated, an enlarged body of scientific data is available to
plaintiffs, specialized agencies are present to advise and fur-
nish expert witnesses, and the case law trend is toward pro-
tection of the plaintiffs.7 All this points to a profitable and
vitally useful practice in air pollution suits and it becomes
clear that, once again, private interest and public interest go
hand-in-hand.
II. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF SUIT
Not surprisingly, negligence, trespass, and nuisances
have developed through the years as the traditional theories
upon which pollution suits have been based. But there are
other bases for suit which should be examined. A very im-
portant one is the statutory basis. The attorney should always
look first to the statutory law, an admonition that is fre-
quently forgotten. True, it is not often that a statute specifi-
cally authorizes a private suit. Indeed, it appears that so far
only one statute serves as a basis for suit in the pollution
field. 8 But even if the statute does not create a right to sue
5. A very early case in which the defendant was found to be committing a
nuisance by allowing his hog sty to corrupt the plaintiff's air is William Alfred's
case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611). Damages and an injunction were awarded.
See also Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 92
(1911).
6. See Seamans, Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Pollution, in 2
LEGAL CONTROL OF THE ENVIRONMENT 123 (PLI hndbk. 1970).
7. Id. at 123-4.
8. The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1914) allows recovery of
treble damages by anyone damaged in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. While not an antipollution statute,
this was used as the basis of suit in United States v. Automobile Manufac-
turers Association, Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. 72,907 (C.D. Cal.). There an anti-
trust suit was filed by the Department of Justice against the four major auto-
mobile producers alleging that they unlawfully conspired to delay development
and installation of antipollution devices for cars. The federal district court
enjoined the defendants and they submitted to the judgment without trial or
19721
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in so many words, still it may be useful, for although it allows
only a governmental unit to enforce its provisions, violation
of its provisions may constitute the basis for a negligence
per se action. The fact that the statute is penal in character
does not prevent its use in imposing civil liability, but the
plaintiff must show that he is within the class intended to
be protected by the statute and that the harm suffered was
generally the kind that the statute was intended to prevent.9
A more common theory of suit is the negligence of the
defendant. Of course, in this case the plaintiff must prove
a lack of due care in the exercise of defendant's duty which
resulted in the plaintiff's injury. This proof may occasionally
be simple and easy. For example, in Greyhound Corp. v.
Blakely,10 the plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's bus
where she inhaled air containing a toxic amount of carbon
monoxide. In a negligence action she was awarded a sub-
stantial recovery for the nerve and brain damage she suf-
fered. But it is more likely that the plaintiff will encouter
severe, perhaps insurmountable problems in proving causa-
tion, especially where there are multiple polluters. However,
several authorities say that much of this problem can be
overcome by joining the major polluters in the area as class
defendants."
Many of the major air pollution suits have been based
on negligence and they are instructive of the various causa-
tion problems which may be encountered. An exemplary case
is Hagy v. Allied Chemical and Dye Corp.12 There the plain-
tiffs sued for personal injuries sustained while driving past
the defendant's plant through a sulphuric smog created by the
finding of fact. The city of New York (joined by several other urban areas
and individuals as ainici curiae) appealed asking for a clause in the decree
enabling the consent decree to be admissible as evidence that the charges were
true, thus aiding future private suits, but the appeal was denied by the U.S.
Supreme Court in City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
Nevertheless, a number of private civil suits for treble damages have been
filed. See N. LANDAU and P. RHENGOLD, THE ENiRONmENTAL LAW HAND-
DooK §4.7(b) (1971). See also S.C. CODE §63-195.28 (Supp. 1970).
9. PRoSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §35 (3rd ed. 1964).
10. 262 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958).
11. See Rheingold, supra note 3, at 28 and Esposito, Air & Water Pollu-
tion: What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV.
Lin. L. PRv. 32 (1970).
12. 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P2d 86 (1953).
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defendant's release of sulphur dioxide during a known tem-
perature inversion. Negligence was admitted. The plaintiffs
claimed that the smog aggravated Mrs. Hagy's previously un-
diagnosed cancer of the larynx and Mr. Hagy's heart condi-
tion. Mrs. Hagy's larynx was later removed due to the cancer
and it was the plaintiff's contention that the cancer was dor-
mant but became active due to aggravation by the smog, and
that the removal of the larynx might have been averted were
it not for this aggravation. Medical testimony was taken that
sulphur dioxide severely irritates the tissues of the throat
and that it could cause the cancer to "light up." The defen-
dants asserted that, as a matter of law, the evidence was
insufficient to support the implied finding of the jury that
there was such a causal connection between the defendant's
negligence and plaintiffs' injury. The court affirmed the ver-
dict of the trial court for the plaintiffs saying,
The burden did not rest upon respondents to prove that the removal
of respondent's larynx would not have been necessary but for her
exposure to the smog; the burden was rather upon appellants to con-
vince the jury that the operation would have been ultimately necessary
in any event, even though the cancerous larynx had not been trauma-
tized by the irritation of the smog.13
Mrs. Hagy was awarded $25,000 and her husband was
awarded $5,000.00.
In Hagy, the "take your victim as you find him" tort con-
cept was not challenged, but in a more recent case it was a
part of the decision. In Heckt v. Beryllium Corp.,14 the plain-
tiff resided several miles from the defendant's plant and in-
haled the emissions of the plant which was the only major
source of beryllium in the area. In 1950, the Atomic Energy
Commission established a toxicity level for beryllium that
should not be exceeded in out-plant areas. Prior to 1950 there
were no regulations, but the defendant knew of the toxicity
of beryllium. From 1951 to 1955 the defendant's emissions
exceeded the permitted safe maximum. The trial court granted
the defendant a judgment non obstante veredicto on the basis
of expert testimony that the plaintiff's illness could have been
caused by the 1951-55 emissions only if she had been over-
exposed to toxic emissions prior to 1951. The upper court
reversed on appeal, ruling that because of the unknown de-
13. Id. at 370, 265 P.2d at 92.
14. 424 Pa. 140, 226 A.2d 87 (1966).
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gree of exposure before 1951 and the dangerous nature of the
substance, the excessive emissions of 1951-55 constituted
negligence, and the defendant was liable for all the harm
caused by its negligent act even though the injury is enhanced
by an unkown physical condition caused by the pre-1951
emissions.15
While Hagy and Heck did not meet overly difficult causa-
tion problems, they do serve to illustrate the types of difficul-
ties which might be faced. For example, is your client's em-
physema a result of the effluent of the paper mill or the fer-
tilizer plant, or the fact that emissions from automobiles in
the city have been equated with smoking two packs of ciga-
rettes a day? Did the paint on your house turn brown because
of the sun or air pollution? It is not hard to imagine these
problems. Yet the same scientific explosion which helped
bring about the pollution problem offers some solutions. Med-
ical studies increasingly are linking pollution to disease.
Specific substances when emitted frequently cause specific
injuries such as fluoride gases, beryllium dust, welding fumes,
coal dust, asbestos dust, cement and fertilizer offcasts, refin-
eries' exhausts, etc. Some substances, such as benzpyrenes
from gasoline, are carcinogenic.' 0 It is obvious that experts
and technical data must be relied upon. It seems however, that
most medical experts are willing to testify to aggravation of
a preexisting condition or disease rather than direct causa-
tion.' 7
The most difficult causation problem arises where there
are multiple polluters. Can compensation be recovered for
damages suffered from inhalation of general mixed polluted
air? Several diseases and types of property damage result
from chronic exposure to generally polluted air.' s The sug-
gested answer is to eliminate any alternative causes by join-
ing all possible major polluters as defendants. 19 Indeed, this
15. Rheingold, sipra note 3 at 20. See also ANNOT., 54 A.L.R. 2d 764
(1957).
16. Id.
17. Van Doren, Air Polhtion-Expanding Citizens Remedies, 32 OHIo
ST. L.J. 16 (1971).
18. See, Rheingold, supra note 3, at 20.
19. Id. See also Esposito, Air & Water Pollution: What to Do While
Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. Lia. L. REv. 32 (1970)
(hereinafter cited as Esposito).
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was tried on a grand scale in the case of Diamond -v. General
Motors Corp.20 which was a class action in behalf of the pop-
ulation of Los Angeles County requesting an injunction to
restrain the defendants from discharging pollutants into the
atmosphere of the county, and other relief. Joined as defen-
dants were 200 major polluters in the county including auto-
mobile manufacturers, innumerable plants, and six airlines.
The defendants' demurrer was sustained.21 Nevertheless, there
is ample precedent for the joinder of several defendants where
pollutants are mixed.
2 2
Causation in the area of property damage has been han-
dled without much trouble in the cases. 23
Further problems may arise in proving that defendant's
behavior was negligent. Here again an exemplary case may
be helpful and Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide24 is particu-
larly useful. The plaintiff sought damages for personal in-
juries caused by fluoride poisoning. The fluorides were alleged
to be windborne from Reynold's plant to the plaintiff's farm
where they were inhaled and ingested with food grown on
the farm. The case centered on whether the fluorides came
from the defendant's plant and caused the plaintiff's injuries,
and whether the defendant was negligent in allowing the
fluoride to escape in amounts large enough to injure the
plaintiff. As to the former question, it was stipulated that
some fluorides did escape from the defendant's plant and fall
at times on plaintiff's farm. Tests by an Oregon State Uni-
versity horticulturist showed generally that there was a
direct relationship between the proximity to the defendant's
works and the amount of fluorine that was found in plant life
(plaintiff's farm was about 11/ miles away), and that there
were substantial amounts of fluorine in plants found in plain-
tiff's land. No proof was given as to what quantities of fluo-
20. No. 947429, Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, California
(1969).
21. See N. LANDAU and P. RHEINGoLD, THE ENVIMONaFNTAL LAW HAND-
300K §5.7 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Jordan v. United Verde Copper Co., 9 F.2d 144 (D.Ariz.
1925).
23. Van Doren, Air Pollution-Expanding Citizens Remedies, 32 OHio
ST. L.J. 15, 26 (1971). See, e.g., Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis.
2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969). According to Judge Jasen's dissent in Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 320 (1970).
24. 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958).
1972]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss5/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
rides were in the gases and air passing over the plaintiff's
land, but proof was given that these are toxic. Likewise,
there was no showing of exactly where the escaped fluorides
actually settled. There was proof of fluorosis damage in the
plaintiff's cattle and also evidence that the glass in the
plaintiff's home had become etched by acid, probably hydro-
fluoric acid which was one of the defendant's effluents. Sub-
stantial medical testimony linked plaintiff's disabilities with
the fluorides escaping from the plant. The court ruled that
this evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine whether
defendant's effluent had caused plaintiff's injuries.
In regard to the question of negligence, the court said
that in determining the standard of care in this case it should
refer to the defendant's knowledge of potential dangers, for
it was his duty to be aware of the dangers incident to his
activities. The defendant's conduct was to be examined in
view of this knowledge. The defendant was fully aware of
the dangers involved in the escape of fluorides. The question
then was, in view of this knowledge, was there failure to use
reasonable care for the protection of the plaintiff. The de-
fendant argued and proved that he was using the latest pollu-
tion control devices. The court stressed the superior knowledge
of the defendant and the duty such knowledge placed on him,
2 15
and testimony that ordinarily, persons in the plaintiff's posi-
tion would not suffer fluorosis from a nearby plant. Thus the
case was a proper one for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur inference of negligence, and the lower court judg-
ment for the plaintiffs was upheld.
While touching on it, Yturbide does not answer a major
question in the negligence anti-pollution actions. That is,
what is the standard of care to be applied in these private air
pollution suits. Must the defendant use the latest pollution
control devices, even if his profit margin will be drastically
reduced, or is his duty of care met by using the devices which
others around him are using? The question is not yet settled.
The standard adopted obviously will depend upon the courts'
view of the social utility and urgency of air pollution con-
trol.2  However, two recent cases, neither founded in negli-
gence, may indicate a trend. In Renken v. Harvey Aluminum,
25. The court referred here to RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToTs §289
(1965).
26. Juergensmeyer, supra note 2 at 1147.
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Inc. 27 an injunction was sought to force the defendant to
cease his trespass on plaintiff's orchard through the settling
of his effluent fluoride particles. The constant settling of the
fluorides was a continuous trespass which the court consid-
ered interchangeable with nuisance. The court determined
that the installation of certain antipollution devices would
greatly reduce the escape of the harmful fluorides. Rather
than grant damages for the past and prospective trespasses,
the court ordered the defendant to install the devices within
one year or be enjoined from operation. The court stated:
[O]nce the plaintiffs established that fluorides were deposited on their
lands from the plant of the defendant, the burden of going forward
with the evidence was on the defendant to show that the use of its
property, which caused the injury, was unavoidable or that it could
not be prevented except by the expenditure of such vast sums of
money as would substantially deprive it of the use of its property.
2 8
Renken thus suggests that the standard will be that polluters
must use all available control devices as long as the ex-
pense does not substantially deprive them of the use of their
property.
In the most recent case, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,2 9
the court awarded the plaintiff $185,000 permanent damages
for depreciation of property values caused by dust and other
chemical products thrown into the air by defendant's rock
quarry. The court refused, however, to issue an injunction,
balancing the economic equities in favor of the defendant and
taking note of the fact that defendant was using the most
modern control devices. Judge Jasen, dissenting from the
refusal to enjoin quarry operations, indicated that the stan-
dard set forth in Renken may not be enough. Said the judge:
I am aware that the trial court found that the most modem dust
control devices available have been installed in defendant's plant, but,
I submit, this does not mean that better and more effective dust con-
trol devices could not be developed within the time allowed to abate
the pollution.
Moreover, I believe it is incumbent upon the defendant to develop
such devices, since the cement company, at the time the plant com-
menced production (1962), was well aware of plaintiff's presence in
the area as well as of the probable consequences of its contemplated
operation. Yet, they still chose to build and operate the plant at this
site.
27. 226 F. Supp. 169 (D.Ore. 1963).
28. Id. at 174.
29. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
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In a day when there is a growing concern for clean air, highly
developed industry should not expect acquiescence by the courts, but
should, instead, plan its operations to eliminate contamination of our
air and damage to its neighbors.3 0
Perhaps, then, the standard of care of the future will
require the polluter to participate in the development of more
effective air pollution control devices. Perhaps the courts will
begin to realize that in an era of rapidly intensifying air pol-
lution problems, industry cannot be allowed to defend its con-
duct with a mere "I'm doing all I can." The technological
capacity of the United States indicates that more can be done,
and it is becoming more apparent that the courts have a
strong role to play in compelling more to be done.
One theory of air pollution suits that has been frequently
seen in the courts is nuisance. It has even been facetiously
alleged that the first air pollution nuisance action arose when
a caveman's campfire smoke entered his neighbor's cave, and
that the remedy was abatement by club.31 In any case it's
clear that nuisance actions for air pollution extend back hun-
dreds of years, 32 and, as might be expected, several difficulties
with this theory have developed. The trouble here is not what
is the law; it is what is a nuisance. To make the problem even
more interesting, there is a categorization problem within
the categorization problem. It would be well then to review
a few basics.
To begin, there are probably as many definitions of
nuisance as there are attorneys in the United States. One
succinct definition is:
"Nuisance" is anything that unlawfully works inconvenience or dam-
age to others from unreasonable or unlawful use of property.33
The interference with the plaintiff's interests must be sub-
stantial, the standard being definite offensiveness, inconven-
ience, or annoyance to the normal person in the community.34
Historically there have been two lines of development, classi-
fied as public nuisance and private nuisance. A private nui-
30. Id. at 231, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
31. Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pol-
lition. 10 ARIz. L. REV. 107 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Porter].
32. See note 5, supra.
33. Deason v. Southern Ry., 142 S.C. 328, 334, 140 S.E. 575, 577 (1927).
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sance is a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in
land, whose remedy lies in the hands of the individual of-
fended.3 5 A public nuisance consists of an interference with
the rights of the community at large, which may include vir-
tually anything, and the remedy lies in the hands of the state.36
Theoretically, the two have almost nothing in common, except
that each causes inconvenience to someone.
37
The first difficulty stems directly from this dichotomy,
for the application of public nuisance is severely restricted.
To be considered public, the nuisance must affect an interest
common to the general public, rather than one peculiar to a
few individuals. 38 If the action is classified as a public nui-
sance, generally only the state or its agents may proceed
against the polluter.3 9 It is well settled law that for an indi-
vidual to have cause of action in public nuisance he must be
able to show that he has suffered special damage over and
different from the ordinary damage caused to the public at
large.4 0 The rule is that the plaintiff's damage must be differ-
ent in kind, rather than in degree, from that shared by the
general public.41 On the other hand, it has been suggested that
while the plaintiff has no action for infringement of a theo-
retical right which he shares with the public at large, he is
entitled to relief when that infringement also causes him
substantial harm.42 That is, where the plaintiff suffers per-
sonal injury, harm to his chattels, or interference with the
use and enjoyment of his land the nuisance becomes a private
35. Id. at §87.
36. Id. In S. C. it has been said, "Whatever tends to endanger life or gen-
erate disease and affects the health of the community, whatever shocks the pub-
lic morals and sense of decency, and whatever shocks the religious feelings of
the community, or tends to its discomfort, is generally at common law a 'public
nuisance' and a crime." State v. Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 496, 18 S.E.2d 372, 37S
(1942).
37. PRossER, supra note 34, at §87.
38. Id. at §89.
39. Id.
40. Id. See e.g., Bowlin v. George, 239 S.C. 429, 123 S.E.2d 528 (1962) ;
Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 45 S.E2d 603 (1948).
41. PROSSER, supra note 34, at §89. See, e.g., Belton v. Wateree Power Co.
123 S.C. 291, 115 S.E. 587 (1922). Note, however, that the rule does not pre-
clude a negligence action brought upon the same facts. Kneece v. City of Co-
lumbia, 128 S.C. 375, 128 S.E. 100 (1924).
42. PRossER, supra note 34, at §89. This concept has been referred to as.
"mixed nuisance" in South Carolina in Deason v. Southern Ry., 142 S.C. 328,
140 S.E. 575 (1927).
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as well as a public one.4 3 Even so, the adherence of the courts
to the difference in kind rule remains important for it is
argued that most instances of air pollution are public nui-
sances rather than private due to the wide diffusion of pol-
lutants through shifting winds and air currents. This being
true, our increased awareness of the widespread effects of
even localized air pollution may severely limit application
of private nuisance as the "kinds" of common damages which
we perceive are increased. 44 It is hoped that the rise in anti-
pollution statutory law will solve this problem, and it is of-
fered that state statutes are increasingly preempting public
nuisance law in the field of air pollution.
45
Even if the action is categorized as private nuisance, how-
ever, there are problems to be faced, such as the conceptual
and categorization problems seen in common law involving
"nuisance per se" and "nuisance per accidens." The former
was such an interference as would be a nuisance at all times
and under all circumstances while the latter was a nuisance
only because of its location or the circumstances surrounding
its operation. 40 Both resulted in liability regardless of the
degree of care shown when substantial injury occurred. It
is obvious that a lawful business could never be a nuisance per
se.47 Trouble first developed when the trespass case of Rylands
-v. Fletcher48 somehow became the rule of absolute liability
in nuisance law. That is, if one realized that his emissions
43. See, e.g., Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Const. Inc., 174 Neb. 234, 117
N.W.2d 322 (1962); Heinl v. Pecher, 330 Pa. 232, 198 A. 797 (1938). An
illustrative case is Sullivan v. American Mfg. Co., 33 F.2d 690 (1929). Here
the plaintiff sought to recover damages to property and health resulting from
effluent from defendant's bagging plant in Charleston, S. C. The evidence
showed that defendant's plant emitted gases, vapors, dust & lint which were
blown by the winds over the whole neighborhood, inconveniencing and discom-
forting those who resided there. The trial court ruled that this was a public
nuisance and nonsuited the plaintiff as having injuries different only in degree
from others in the neighborhood. The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing
the different in kind rule, but saying that an injury to private property or to
the health and comfort of an individual in the enjoyment of his property is in
its nature damage of a special character within the meaning of the rule.
44. Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 1135.
45. Porter, supra note 31, at 108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glen Alden
Corp., 418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 256 (1965).
46. Porter, supra note 31, at 109.
47. Id.
48. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
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would probably result in injury to his neighbor, he was liable
despite his exercise of reasonable care.49 The effect of this
was to indicate that intentional nuisances were to be treated
differently from unintentional negligent nuisances, ignoring
the basic fact that negligence is not a necessary element in
the proof of a nuisance.5° The confusion was compounded by
the definition set out in the Restatement of Torts referring
to private nuisance in terms of intent and reasonableness.5 '
The general result has been an inability of the courts to settle
on the proper bases of liability for nuisance and the decisions
vary widely.52 Professor Prosser has set out the three major
bases, however:
[L]iability for nuisance may rest upon an intentional invasion of the
plaintiff's interests, or a negligent one, or conduct which is abnormal
and out of place in its surroundings, and so falls fairly within the
principle of strict liability.
By far the greater number ...are intentional ...in the sense
that the defendant has created or continued the condition causing the
nuisance with full knowledge that the harm to the plaintiff's interest
is substantially certain to follow.
But a nuisance may also result from conduct which is merely neg-
ligent, where there is no intent to interfere in any way with the plain-
tiff, but merely a failure to take precautions against a risk apparent
to a reasonable man.
53
Unfortunately there are also some practical problems to
be considered in a private nuisance action. The polluter may
have acquired a prescriptive right to pollute if his emissions
have continued over a period of time.54 Or, the plaintiff may
be estopped from bringing the action because they "came to
49. Frost v. Berkely Phosphate Co., 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280 (1894).
50. Porter, supra note 31, at 111. Professor Prosser has recognized the
confusion and has stated that nuisance has reference only to the interests in-
vaded and not to any particular act or omission which has led to the invasion.
See generally PROSSER, mrpra note 34, at §88.
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §822 (1939).
52. See, e.g., Wright v. Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1966);
Assoc. Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chemical & Research, Inc., 82 NJ.
Super. 281, 197 A.2d 569 (1963); Evans v. Moffat, 192 Pa. Super. 204, 160
A.2d 465 (1960) ; Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954).
53. PROSSER, supra note 34, §88 at 595-6.
54. See, e.g., Dangels v. McLean Fire Brick Co., 287 F. 2d 14 (6th Cir.
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the nuisance." 5 But despite this seeming multitude of prob-
lems, the digests are replete with nuisance actions brought
for the recovery of air pollution damages, many of which
have been successful.
56
Many of these problems can be avoided by proceeding on
another traditional theory: trespass. There are even distinct
advantages to be had with this theory, namely, statutes of
limitations are usually longer for trespass actions than for
nuisance and theoretically no damage need be shown for the
plaintiff to prevail. Further, modern cases have broadened
the scope of trespass so as to make it more inclusive of air
pollution problems. For example, one leading case is Fairview
Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co.,57 in which the plaintiff
brought a trespass action seeking the recovery of $3,000 dam-
ages for injury to his farm and cattle. The injury was al-
legedly caused by airborne gases, liquids, and solids containing
fluorides which came from defendant's plant and settled upon
plaintiff's farm. The defendant argued that the particles were
so minute as to be invisible and that therefore the proper
action was nuisance, but the court considered the trespass
action well founded. It said that the historical distinction
between trespass and nuisance concerned a court's ability to
ascertain if some direct invasion was in fact made. So, intan-
gibles and unseens such as odors and gases were historically
nuisances rather than trespasses. But the two torts are not
mutually exclusive. The court held that with the aid of mod-
ern scientific detecting methods it could determine the exis-
tence of a physical entry of tangible matter, even if unseen,
and that a deposit of this matter on plaintiff's farm was a
trespass. Damages were awarded for the longer period of the
trespass statute of limitations.
Similarly, in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,58 the intru-
sion of fluoride particulates from defendant's plant was con-
sidered a trespass. There the defendants asserted that the
mere settling of the deposits on the plaintiff's land was not a
55. Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 1137. The general rule is, however,
that coming to the nuisance does not preclude recovery. See Carter v. Lake
City Baseball Club, 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1951).
56. See, e.g., Woodstock Hardwood & Spool Mfg. Co. v. Charleston Light
& Water Co., 63 S.E. 548 (S.C. 1909) ; Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper
& Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
57. 176 F. Supp. 178 (D.Ore. 1959).
58. 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959).
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sufficient breaking and entering or direct invasion to consti-
tute a trespass. But the court disagreed:
[I]n this atomic age even the uneducated know the great and awful
force contained in the atom and what it can do to a man's property
if it is released. In fact, the now famous equation E = MC2 has taught
us that mass and energy are equivalents, and that our concept of
"things" must be refrained....
Of these, we must look to the character of the instrumentality
which is used in making an intrusion upon another's land; we prefer
to emphasize the object's energy or force rather than its size. Viewed
in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion which invades the
possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that
intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which
can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicist 59
III. NEW THEORIES OF SUIT
In addition to the well-known theories discussed above,
there are several new theories of suit for air pollution dam-
ages which have been suggested. One which has already had
some development is the utlrahazardous activities (strict
liability) theory of liability. The concept is that where one
carries on that type of activity which is considered extra-
hazardous or abnormally dangerous, he will be liable for all
the damages resulting from this activity, regardless of care-
fulness or intent. While he is allowed to engage in this ac-
tivity and cannot be enjoined from carrying it on, he is strictly
responsible for any injuries which ensue.
Cases brought upon this theory have had variable success.
The leading case, Luthringer v. Moore,60 was successful. Mr.
Luthringer, a drugstore employee, was injured when he
worked in the store over a basement where the defendant had
released deadly hydrocyanic gas in an effort to exterminate
vermin. The plaintiff based his suit on strict liability result-
ing from defendant's engagement in an ultrahazardous ac-
tivity. The court stated:
One who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another
whose person, land, or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm
resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous,
although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm .... An
activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of harm
59. Id. at 93-94, 342 P.2d at 793-94.
60. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
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to the person, land, or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated
by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common
usage.61
The plaintiff was awarded $10,000 damages.
In a case following Lutthringer, the plaintiff recovered
damages to her cotton crop which resulted when the chemical
dust manufactured by defendant and used by a third party
for his rice crop drifted and settled on plaintiff's cotton.
62
The court recited portions of Luthringer, pointed out that the
perils attending the use of the dust were well known, and
stated that when one casts into the air a substance which
he knows may do damage to others either in ignorance or
indifference as to how far it will travel and what damage it
will do, the rule of strict liability should be applied. It is
important to note here, however, that the court did not grant
judgment against the third party who actually used the dust
Thus, even though the court cited Luthringer and spoke in
terms of ultrahazardous activity, this case may actually lend
more support for an action based on products liability.
In a third case, Fritz v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,63
the ultrahazardous activity theory was not successful. There
the court found that the use of chlorine gas was not so unusual
or hazardous that the defendant should have foreseen the risk
of injury, and therefore the defendant was not strictly liable.
Despite this setback some authorities claim that there is a
decided trend of extension of the concept of strict liability to
those who pollute the air.64 Others are not so optimistic and
suggest that the plaintiff be able to complain of nuisance,
trespass, or negligence, too.65 Conversely, if these fail, per-
haps the attorney should consider an ultrahazardous activity
approach.
Another new theory, not yet well developed in the case
law is products liability. Historically, manufacturers and sup-
pliers of defective equipment have frequently been sued for
the escape of gas from their products or other product ori-
61. Id. at 498, 190 P2d at 7.
62. Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W. 2d 820
(1949).
63. 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 256 (1950).
64. N. LANDAU and P. RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONmENTAL LAW HANDBOOX,
§1.7(d) (1971).
65. Juergensmeyer, supra note 2, at 1152.
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ented dangers. 66 But the theory is not expected to be limited
to these cases and is hoped to have great future potential for
air pollution suits.67 The most powerful case is hoped to be
made against the major automobile manufacturers inasmuch
as automobiles account for between forty and sixty percent
of all air pollution.6 8 The law is clear that the negligent manu-
facturer of a product is liable for the injury resulting from
the use of his defective product, and it is equally clear that
the manufacturer's duty extends to those without privity, but
whom the manufacturer should expect to be endangered by
its probable use.69 The negligence here would be the design of
a vehicle and its manufacture in a way which allows the emis-
sion of large amounts of dangerous exhaust fumes.7 0 Causa-
tion problems could be overcome by joining the major auto
makers and having the suit brought by persons who would
be particularly exposed to these exhausts, like taxi drivers or
traffic police. The difficult part would be proving that the
manufacturers had failed to exercise due care to minimize
the dangerous emissions. But there has already been one suit
charging the manufacturers with complicity in the failure to
develop new anti-pollution devices, and there will be others.7 1
The success of any of these would suffice to show negligent
or intentional wrongdoing. Or, rapidly developing concepts
of strict product liability might sweep away the need to prove
negligence.
7 2
Several other possible theories, without much basis in
the case law, have been suggested by the scholars.7 3 Some of
these are: (1) stockholder derivative suits against corporate
directors for breach of fiduciary duties, (2) suits against
66. Rheingold, .supra note 3 at 26. See Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,
215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.2d
603 (Fla. 1958); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850
(1945).
67. Esposito, supra note 19 at 38.
68. Id. Another target may be the major oil companies if it can be shown
that the gasoline presently used is formulated to produce unnecessary pollutants.
Rheingold, supra note 3, at 29 n.64.
69. See generally PROSSER, supra note 34, at §§96-97.
70. Rheingold, supra note 3, at 29. See J. C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Williams,
85 Ga. App. 538, 69 S.E2d 816 (1952).
71. See note 8, supra.
72. Esposito, supra note 19, at 39 n.31.
73. See Esposito, upra note 19, at 40-51; N. LANDAu and P. RHEINGOLD,
THE ENviRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK §§1.7-.8 (1971).
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public officials for failure to abate pollution nuisances, (3)
antitrust suits, and (4) suits grounded in civil rights and the
Constitution. The success of these theories has yet to be
proven but the attorney should be aware of particular situa-
tions in which they apply.
IV. DAMAGES
The rules for damages in air pollution cases are generally
the same as for any tort action. When the suit is founded in
nuisance, however, there are certain considerations which
must be attended to. Essentially, a distinction is made between
permanent and temporary nuisances. The distinction is often
difficult to make, 74 but a permanent nuisance generally is "an
interference that can reasonably be expected to continue in-
definitely into the future without reduction." 75 Thus, any air
pollution which is not readily corrected or abated is a perma-
nent nuisance. For a permanent nuisance, the measure of
damages is the diminution or depreciation in property value;
i.e., the difference between the market value of the plaintiff's
property for his uses before and after the inception of the
nuisance as an actionable interference.78 Environmental pol-
lution due to an unreasonable use of property which interferes
with another's interest is a temporary nuisance, which should
be abated.7 7 But damages also may be recovered, measured
by the diminution of the use value of the property while the
nuisance continues up to the time of trial.78 This diminution
is usually tested by the decrease in rental value, although the
market value of the property might be referred to in deter-
mining the reasonability of the damage award. 9 Of course,
in addition to property damages, special damages for personal
74. See Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelley, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1961).
75. Porter, supra note 31, at 116.
76. Id. See, e.g., Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 245 P.2d 255
(1952); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970); Economy Furniture, Inc. v. Jirasek, 345 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. 1961).
77. Schmitz, Pollution, Law,' Science, and Damage Awards, 18 Clev.
St.L.Rev. 456, 459 (1969). See Commonwealth v. Hanzlik, 400 Pa. 134, 161
A.2d 340 (1960).
78. Porter, supra note 31, at 116.
79. Id. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Pritchard, 71 Ariz. 117, 223 P.2d 933 (1950);
Adams Constr. Co. v. Bentley, 335 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1960); Cooper Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Johnston, 234 Miss. 432, 106 So.2d 889 (1958); Karpisek v.
Cather & Sons Constr., Inc., 174 Neb. 234, 117 N.W.2d 322 (1962).
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discomfort, annoyance or inconvenience, injury to health, or
reasonable expenses may be recovered for either permanent
or temporary nuisances.8 0
This distinction between permanent and temporary nui-
sance is also important in determining whether or not succes-
sive actions may be brought. If it is a permanent nuisance
action, all damages, past and prospective, must be recovered
in one suit,8 1 but if the nuisance is temporary, successive suits
may be brought for the continuing interference.8 2 The statute
of limitations is also said not to run on a temporary nuisance
cause of action since the injury is continuing and new dam-
ages are accruing constantly.8 3 In any case, the equitable and
legal remedies for pollution are concurrent, and damages may
be recovered even if an injunction has been issued.
84
Of greater importance, perhaps, than compensatory dam-
ages is the possibility of recovery of punitive damages since
they are likely to be substantially larger than actual damages.
Generally, punitive damages will be awarded only where the
defendant's actions have been so flagrant that malice may
be attributed to him or where his pollution has intentionally
and persistently been maintained with a reckless disregard
for others.8 5 Thus, an asphalt plant was held liable for puni-
tive damages based on the willful disregard of surrounding
property when it continued its pollution of the air unabated
despite the numerous complaints of neighbors.8 6 And, in the
outstanding case of Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert,8 7 treble
punitive damages were awarded when testimony showed that
the plant management was aware that harmful fluorides were
being emitted and that their attitude was that it was cheaper
80. The exemplary case here is Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Johnston,
234 Miss. 432, 106 So.2d 889 (1958) where $3600 was awarded for depreciation
in rental value and $500 was awarded for annoyance and discomfort.
81. See, e.g., Tucson v. Apache Motors, 74 Ariz. 98, 245 P2d 255 (1952);
Caldwell v. Knox Concrete Prod., Inc., 54 Tenn. App. 393, 391 S.W.2d 5
(1964).
82. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Wand, 308 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1962).
83. Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1965).
84. Gutteringer v. Calaveras Cement Co., 160 Cal. App.2d 460, 325 P.2d
145 (1958).
85. See Newman v. Nelson, 350 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1965); Gorman v.
Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956).
86. Claude v. Weaver Constr. Co., 158 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1968).
87. 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963).
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to pay claims than abate the nuisance. Further, the trend
appears to be toward broadening the conception of malice
for punitive damages purposes. In the recent Oregon case
of McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,s8 the plaintiff sued in
nuisance for injuries suffered when toxic gases, fumes, smoke
and particles blew onto his land from the defendant's paper
mill. The court said that "the intentional disregard of the
interest of another is the equivalent of legal malice, and justi-
fied punitive damages .... '"89 The court held that punitive
damages would lie if the jury found that the defendant had
not done everything reasonably possible to minimize the dam-
age to adjoining property. It has been suggested that this
decision now means that failure of the defendant to keep
abreast of and utilize the most adequate pollution control
technology will render him liable for punitive damages.90
Equally as important are several practical considerations.
Where the plaintiff is faced with multiple defendants in that
all offending sources are sued, there are precedents for joint
and several liability taken from water pollution cases. 91 If not
all the polluters can be named as defendants, however, the sit-
uation is more difficult. But it has been asserted that under
the doctrine that a tortfeasor is anyone who has caused sub-
stantial injury, although not the totality of it, a suit could
be brought against the major polluters only. 2 Here, the bur..
den would usually be put upon the plaintiff to show the harm
that each defendant did to him,93 but again there is water
pollution precedent for placing the burden on the defendant
to limit his liability.
94
In regard to practicalities, one successful attorney has
listed seven basic categories of damages which may be recov-
88. 421 P.2d 957 (Ore. 1967).
89. Id. at 958.
90. Esposito, supra note 19, at 37.
91. Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931). See generally
PROSSER, supra note 34, at §42. However, some cases require the plaintiff to
prove what part of the damage was attributable to each defendant. See, e.g.,
Vaughn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206, 84 S.E.2d 568 (1954).
92. Rheingold, supra note 3, at 31. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §431 (1965).
93. See PROSSER, supra note 34, at §41.




Pearlman: Actions for Damages for Air Pollution Injuries
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
NoTEs
ered in air pollution cases.95 They are: (1) medical, hospital
and related expenses for a person whose health is impaired
by reason of the pollution, (2) pain, suffering and discomfort
sustained by such a person, (3) loss of consortium by the
spouse of such a person, (4) property damage including the
cost of repair, replacement or correction of damage and the
cost of necessary measures taken to prevent further damage,
(5) diminution in market value of the property for a perma-
nent nuisance or rental value for temporary nuisance, (6)
damages for loss of normal use and enjoyment of one's prop-
erty, and (7) damages for annoyance, inconvenience and
discomfort.9 6 He points out that tort lawyers should have no
trouble with the first four categories but warns against con-
fusing the last two for the same thing. They are not and he
distinguishes them by saying that number six is damage sus-
tained by a plaintiff in his capacity as the occupier of realty
while number seven consists of damages sustained by him as
an individual in the daily routines of life. The elements of
number seven are analogous to pain and suffering and are
best left to the jury, but with number six the jury may con-
sider the rental value of the premises in assessing the loss of
use and enjoyment.97
Finally, this attorney evaluates settlement factors. In
his successful case,98 the most valuable elements were the
"intangible" damages such as normal use and enjoyment.
The greatest part of the verdicts appeared to be for these
even when claims were also made for actual bodily injury or
disease. Personal injury was second. There seemed to be little
regard paid to claims for diminution of market values. The
awards varied approximately in proportion to the plaintiff's
exposure to the pollution. It was his conclusion, then, that
the jury may be more impressed with the value of interference
with the normal day-to-day living and comfort than with
actual tangible damages. 99
95. Hadden, Civil Action Againrst Air Pollution, 49 MiCH. ST.B.J. 34
(1970).
96. Id. at 36.
97. Id. at 37.
98. Heine v. Budd Co., No. 56172 Circuit Court of Wayne County, Mich.
(1969).
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V. CONCLUSION
The expanding scope of the problem and the multiplicity
of legal considerations inevitably limits the educational value
of any single article on private suits for air pollution dam-
ages. As in any rapidly developing field of law, great effort
and time must be invested by the attorney in exploring every
avenue of attack and in versing himself in the latest trends.
But it is hoped that the survey approach of this note will
remind the practicing attorney of the potentialities of private
air pollution suits, and will caution him as to some of the
major areas of concern. Substantial recoveries are being made
in suits based upon negligence, nuisance, trespass and strict
liability, and the future holds promise that this will continue
to be a rapidly growing area of private practice. The un-
shrinking extent of public concern will require the attorney
to participate in the fight on air pollution not only as a com-
munity leader, but also as a professional warrior. It is an
unusual opportunity for the practicing attorney to pursue
worthwhile reward while contributing a positive benefit to
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